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# A NEW LOOK AT INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THEOLOGY: A RETRIEVAL OF FILIPINO *LOOB- KAPWA* RELATIONALITY IN DIALOGUE WITH GABRIEL MARCEL AND LUDWIG BINSWANGER

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Diocese of Sorsogon, Philippines**Abstract:**

Although Marcel and Binswanger are contemporaries both in terms of historical period and intellectual pursuit, it is curious that they are never discussed together. Hence, this essay will attempt to explore some areas of convergences and divergences between these two intersubjective thinkers who are considered to be indispensable interlocutors in the I-thou discourse. In this article, as another attempt to take the discourse on intersubjectivity a little bit further, Marcel and Binswanger are placed in dialogue with the Filipino concept of *loob-kapwa*, which the author believes provides a hospitable home, when seen against the background of Nicosescu's "Included Middle", for the intersubjective relation that they are proposing. The author asserts that *loob-kapwa* tandem, without turning a blind eye towards its negative tendencies, is a viable answer to the "problem of crossing-over" that remained to be a philosophical baggage for both Marcel and Binswanger courtesy of their Modern upbringing, because the chasm, at least conceptually, is absent in the Filipino estimation of the *loob-kapwa* intersubjective bond.

**Keywords:**

*intersubjectivity • theology • Loob-Kapwa • relationality • trinitarian God*

## Introduction

Contemporary theology, like in any period of history, is in search for new models and metaphors that appeal to contemporary taste, temperament and language. With the remarkable popularity of postmodern thinking in the contemporary world, wherein the importance of alterity and difference has taken the center stage, one is challenged to formulate new theological articulations that take into serious consideration the new questions that arise from the present pluralistic society and, at the same time, recover elements that are essential to theology.

Thus, in this paper, for the very first time, I propose to bring together in a meaningful dialogue on 'Intersubjectivity' the following: 1) Creative Fidelity in the Philosophy of Existence of Gabriel Marcel; 2) Phenomenology of Love in the Existential Psychology of Ludwig Binswanger; 3) the "Included Middle" in Barasab Nicolescu's Quantum Physics; and 4) the peculiar relationship between the *loob* and the *kapwa* as construed by some Filipino scholars in the fields of theology, psychology, philosophy, anthropology, sociology and management. I argue that the Filipino concepts of *loob-kapwa*, without disregarding the problematic tendencies entrenched in this tandem, provide a viable answer to the problem of bridging the existential chasm between the subject and the object that remained to be a philosophical baggage for both Marcel and Binswanger courtesy of their *Modern* upbringing marked by the radical solipsism that originated in Descartes' discovery of the "*Je suis, J'existe*". I believe that with this, a new avenue towards meaningful way of talking about faith in the academy will unfold.

## Marcel and Intersubjectivity

To explore Gabriel Marcel's notion of Creative Fidelity is not an easy task,<sup>1</sup> especially because his way of philosophizing is not so straightforward<sup>2</sup> manner that one stumbles upon layers and layers of confusing but important digressions. Although he is generally categorized as an "existential philosopher", he prefers to be identified as a "believing" Catholic, a "neo-Socratic" or a "Christian Socratic" philosopher to set him apart from other existentialist philosophers,<sup>3</sup> especially Jean Paul Sartre,

who have the predilection to characterize the 'self' as an isolated *ego*,<sup>4</sup> to "preach" about the death of God,<sup>5</sup> and to project lived experience as having 'no exit'.<sup>6</sup> Marcel, in contrast to Sartre, spends his philosophical energy by reflecting on themes that have to do with intersubjectivity, the 'Absolute Thou,' grace, humility, courage, and hope. This is precisely the reason why Kenneth Gallagher, an expert on Marcel's philosophy, has asserted that, for Marcel, "authentic human existence is existence-in-communion; it is the *thou* who gives me to myself."<sup>7</sup> For Marcel, the intersubjective "area" is located in the horizon of love.<sup>8</sup>

Marcel prefers to dwell in the concrete and lived world rather than in the 'rational life',<sup>9</sup> because the latter, for him, is a catalyst for human despair.<sup>10</sup> In lieu of the 'rational', he proposes a 'reflective' and intersubjective journey of the *homo viator*.<sup>11</sup> For Marcel, it is through relationships in the context of 'being' (not in the context of 'having') that the love of the I-thou overcomes death and meaninglessness. A conscious effort to overcome 'death and meaninglessness' is genuinely needed because, according to Marcel, the human person has the propensity towards materialism and self-destruction.<sup>12</sup> This belief, then, leads Marcel to profess "to love a being is to say you, you in particular, will never die."<sup>13</sup>

In this logic, Marcel perceives *love* to be the 'essential intellectual datum' that is the ground of hope and immortality.<sup>14</sup> Ultimately, for Marcel, this intersubjective love is anchored in the fidelity of the Absolute Thou (i.e., Marcel's way of naming God) and neither on the I nor on the thou whose limitations are an undeniable existential fact.<sup>15</sup> The foundation of all communions is the Absolute Thou. In the words of Hocking, "it is God from the beginning who shares all of our objects and so is the real medium of communication between one person and another."<sup>16</sup> Hence, Marcel asserts that the best formulation of hope in the context of creative fidelity<sup>17</sup> is expressed in the appeal, "I hope in thee for us."<sup>18</sup>

### **Binswanger and Intersubjectivity<sup>19</sup>**

It is curious that, although Marcel is a contemporary of Ludwig Binswanger both in terms of time and academic interest, there is no solid proof that their paths ever crossed.<sup>20</sup> Ludwig Binswanger, a psychiatrist

by profession, shied away from the reductionistic approach in psychiatry popular during his time. His “new approach” led him to dissociate himself from the tradition of Freudian psychoanalysis despite their “harmonious” professional relationship.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, notwithstanding his great “admiration” of Martin Heidegger, he tried to steer away from some of the “problematic” elements found in Heidegger’s philosophy whose *Dasein* was still undoubtedly Cartesian in essence and obsessed with death.<sup>22</sup> What he tried to develop and promote, instead, was the non-reductionistic approach that obviously bears the mark of Martin Buber’s intersubjective I and thou.<sup>23</sup> For Binswanger, Heidegger’s *Dasein* was suffering from “schizophrenia” which had torn the *Dasein* between “inauthentic being with others” and the “authentic being alone.”<sup>24</sup> In contrast to Heidegger’s “schizophrenic” dealing with the *Dasein*, Binswanger proposes *Daseinsanalyse* or “Existential analysis” which “is an empirical science, with its own method and particular idea of exactness, namely with method and ideal of exactness of the *phenomenological* empirical sciences.”<sup>25</sup> Through this, the *Dasein* is rescued from its tragic solipsism by placing it in the context of what he considered to be a true encounter between the self and the others. Within this horizon, as explained by Roger Frie, Binswanger identifies “the human *Dasein* is an irreducible duality. *Dasein* in its original form is a ‘we-hood,’ against which the expanse of existence, selfhood and individuality appear as secondary.”<sup>26</sup> Moreover, according to Frie, Binswanger provides a framework within which to understand the structure and importance of reciprocity in a love relation.<sup>27</sup> Binswanger was convinced that this “loving mode of being” must be the real objective of any therapist’s relationship with the patient.<sup>28</sup> Thus, it can be said that his theory of intersubjectivity, which locates meaning within the person’s relations to self and others, provided an alternative to Freudian/Lacanian psychopathology, Jasperian incomprehensibility (theoretical exclusion of psychotic patients from psychological understanding)<sup>29</sup> and Heideggerian/Cartesian/Sartrean individualism via a relational dialogue between the I and the thou or the importance of interpersonal love, which Heidegger neglected or eschewed in his theory of authenticity. Self-realization, for Binswanger, can only be attained in the context of reciprocal relationship or within the dialogue between the I and thou.<sup>30</sup> For this, he asserted that “Man is as much a communal as he is an individual being; he navigates

his life back and forth between them.”<sup>31</sup> In an earlier work, he stated that “Being-in-the-world implies always beings in the world with beings such as I, with coexistents.”<sup>32</sup> According to Simon Taylor, for Binswanger “Love is thus both the means through which anxiety is overcome, and the guiding light in the search for authenticity. If anxiety represents the ‘loss of world and self,’ love transcends anxiety by grounding human existence in what Binswanger terms ‘being-beyond-the-world.’”<sup>33</sup> Therefore, for Binswanger, “the split of being into subject (man, person) and object (thing, environment) is now replaced by the unity of existence and ‘world’ secured by transcendence.”<sup>34</sup>

### Marcel and Binswanger in Dialogue on Intersubjectivity

Based on the foregoing discussion, there is indeed a semblance between Marcel’s Christian Socratic philosophy of existence and Binswanger’s existentialist psychology despite the fact that they were unfamiliar with each other’s intellectual legacy. Both Marcel and Binswanger take into serious account the centrality of Love in concrete human life. Marcel, as already mentioned above, believes that *love* overcomes death<sup>35</sup> while Binswanger, in the words of Joeri Schrijvers, “considers the experience of love to be timeless: it can even stand the test of death.”<sup>36</sup> Moreover, Binswanger claims that “life without love is ‘blind,’ and love without life ‘empty.’”<sup>37</sup> For Binswanger, as well as for Marcel, love overcomes death and meaninglessness. Binswanger, based on the analysis of Schrijvers, gives importance to

The fullness of being, revealed through us in love, intimates a ‘being-beyond-the-world-in-the-world’ (*über die Welt hinaus sein*) which overpowers and empowers the existential structures of care and concern. It does so, moreover, by showing ‘being’ as fundamentally relational or intersubjective, for even if one, in a way, always dies alone, one never loves alone as well: it takes two to love – at least.<sup>38</sup>

Both Marcel and Binswanger struggle against the Cartesian ego that inhabits the Heideggerian *Dasein* by focusing on the messy concrete real life situation of the human beings.<sup>39</sup> Marcel adopts what he calls the philosophy of existence that involves “working...up from life to thought and then down from thought to life again, so that [one] may try to throw more light upon life”<sup>40</sup> while Binswanger’s approach is referred to as “Daseinanalysis”<sup>41</sup> which is “neither ontology nor philosophy proper” but

a phenomenological anthropological route that asks the question “what is it, for human being, to be.”<sup>42</sup> For Marcel, “a philosophy that begins with the cogito ... runs the risk of never getting back to being.”<sup>43</sup> Therefore, he asserts that as a philosopher, “I am not a spectator who is looking for a world of structures susceptible to being viewed clearly and distinctly, but rather I listen to voices and appeals comprising that symphony of Being—which is for me, in the final analysis, a supra-rational unity beyond images, words, and concepts.”<sup>44</sup> For, indeed, Marcel contends that “existence precisely cannot be reduced to objectivity.”<sup>45</sup> Binswanger, as rightly noted by van Deurzen, “considers mutuality, or being-with to be fundamental to human existence. Instead of having to choose between Heidegger’s inauthentic being with others or authentic being alone, we can redeem ourselves and others through true encounter in Buberian style. This encounter, which is a loving mode of being, is what the therapist should aim for with the patient.”<sup>46</sup>

Both Marcel and Binswanger take seriously the imperfect situation of the human being. Marcel, on his part, calls it the “broken world,”<sup>47</sup> while Binswanger deals with what he calls ‘*misglückten*’ (i.e., failed or false Dasein). Both the “broken world” and the ‘*misglückten*’ when seen from the perspective of or placed in the region of love reveal the space of the ‘WE’ that cannot simply be swept under the rug or denied. Marcel claims that a philosopher who dwells in the concrete reality of life cannot escape the moral consequences of personal involvement that is grounded in compassion and responsibility. The philosopher, aware of the ‘broken world’, has a moral responsibility vis-à-vis the absurdities and the captivities which menace our planet, to reject cynicism and discover those depths of our shared humanness and of reality which are the sources of faith, love, presence and hope. To fulfill such an important task, the *homo viator* must constantly return to the “creative tension between the I and those depths of our being in and by which we are.”<sup>48</sup> Binswanger, on his part, claims that the “Dasein glimpses itself as *Mitdasein*.”<sup>49</sup> In his critical analysis of Binswanger, Schrijvers reads this statement of Binswanger as an expression of thought that “there is no one that does not want to be loved as much as there is no love for one alone.”<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, Schrijvers surmises that “Love... for Binswanger unites identity and difference, it is the *unio* as *communio*: ‘our’ love is the meeting of you and I with one

another, and, through this, a glimpse of the meeting of all with all.”<sup>51</sup> Hence, I assume that for both Marcel and Binswanger, the ‘loving we’ is an irreducible existential fact.

Another converging point between Marcel and Binswanger is their effort to escape the danger of *solitude á deux*. Marcel tackles this issue by claiming that to love is to experience the presence not only of the beloved but also of eternity, of God.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, he claims that the fidelity of the I and the Thou is anchored in the virtue of Hope, wherein the I professes its dependence on the Absolute Thou. He states: “Hope... is not only a protestation inspired by love, but a sort of a call too, a desperate appeal to an ally who is Himself also love.”<sup>53</sup> Marcel stresses that the real bond that links the I and the Thou is based on “something which transcends<sup>54</sup> them and comprehends them in itself.”<sup>55</sup> To state this more clearly, Donald McCarthy declares that what develops as

intersubjective love on purely human level is but a shadow of the I-Thou relationship with the Absolute Thou, or a preliminary condition for the full establishment through faith. The ontological question, “What am I?”, can thus be answered by an Absolute Thou. An ontological need... shows the need of a change of axis...The Absolute Thou is more completely within the self than the self itself.<sup>56</sup>

This seems to me as expressing the same point that Binswanger has put forward while he endeavors to rescue the ‘lovers’ from the snare of *solitude á deux*. The difference between them, however, lies in the fact that Binswanger deliberately avoids having recourse to the Absolute Thou. Instead, he pursues the path which leads to the unity and difference that the *Dasein* experiences in the atmosphere of intersubjectivity. The course taken by Binswanger, according to Schrijvers,

prevents us from reducing the difference of love to an identity – as when one would lose track of that facticity that I could have loved someone else equally – as much as appropriating this identity of love to such an extent that different loves would no longer be possible – the danger of a *solitude á deux*. Binswanger argues that what reason and rationality can barely understand is the fact that in love there is “coinciding of this *one* particular You and You-ness in general [*einen* geliebten Du und ‘Duhaftigkeit überhaupt]’...This means that here this ontic love – for you – serves as the particular passageway to the idea of love, to the love that extends to all beings. This love here, in this ontic variety, is extended to an ontology of love, as it extends the greeting to life greeting life,



universally. The one Good that you and I share, shares itself with all and everything that can be named 'good'. This is love's principle: it cannot remain content with you and I alone.<sup>57</sup>

It is obvious from the aforementioned "escape routes" provided by Marcel and Binswanger, respectively, that the former pursues what can be considered as theistic existentialism while the latter argues from a non-theistic standpoint. While Marcel, on the one hand, has no qualms of being branded as a Christian Socratic philosopher (being a convert to Catholicism), Binswanger, on the other hand, generally dismisses religion.<sup>58</sup> Perhaps, it is safe to assume that although they come from the same context (i.e. from the rubbles of the world wars) and pursued the same path (i.e., existentialism that deals with the concrete life) they arrived at two different destinations (i.e., Marcel, the Absolute Thou; Binswanger, "ultimately, an *affirmation*, a 'yes' towards one's *thrownness* in being with the other and others"<sup>59</sup>).

### **A Retrieval of the Pre-Modern *LOOB* and *KAPWA***

#### *Identifying the LOOB: A Challenging Journey*

Suffice it to say that when we talk about *loob* we are not dealing with something that is mono-dimensional, hence, we are trying to dip our fingers on something that can be considered as very close to home yet understandably elusive. As a matter of fact, Filipino thinkers and scholars who have been cracking their heads to identify what is essential to *loob* have, despite their apparent agreement, been divided as to the modality of *loob* – especially in relation to the *kapwa*. Thus, we can say that when one attempts to investigate on the Filipino concept of *loob*, he/she is in for a ride. It is certain that in this journey he/she will be greeted with a cacophony of meanings representing the rich and profound dimensions of this indigenous vocabulary. True to its 'nature' as a *conceptus*, indeed, *loob* is undeniably pregnant with meanings,<sup>60</sup> which is clearly demonstrated by the impressive collection of idioms rooted in and related to *loob* with their respective attendant significations (i.e., denotations and connotations) presented in the book written by Albert Alejo, a well-known philosopher and anthropologist in the Philippines, entitled *Tao Po! Tuloy! Isang Landas ng Pag-unawa sa Loob ng Tao*.<sup>61</sup> The existence of surplus meaning as far as



the Filipino *loob* is concerned has definitely caught the interest of scholars from different disciplines and cultural orientations to dig deeper into the “mystery” of the Filipino *loob*. Despite the extensive academic work done by these pundits to identify some common threads that run across the different layers and facets of the Filipino *loob*, the quest for the real essence of *loob* has never been put to a definitive halt. There are some elements of *loob* on which they generally agree but there are also others that continue to evade any final and conclusive unanimity. It is proving to be a never-ending saga because, perhaps, it does not only bear the multiple cultural baggage harnessed from the past history but also continues to pack on new implications as new experiences and circumstances breathe new “life” to the Filipino “*homo viator*”. The concept of *loob* is, indeed, a part of the living reality of every Filipino, just like *nakem* and *buut*, which will unflaggingly escape the clutches of a single monolithic categorization that some academics who are infected by the *idea clara et distincta*<sup>62</sup> bug, courtesy of Modernity, have been endeavoring to find. Thus, it is safe to say that scholars from all sides of the intellectual spectrum will continue to be fascinated by the over-abundance of the concept of *loob*.

Having said all that, I argue that the Filipino concept of *loob* does not only bear some semblance to the ‘self’ as respectively understood by Marcel and Binswanger, but also enriches the ongoing discourse on intersubjectivity because this concept, taken in its pre-modern signification, underlines or brings to the fore some relational components that may either be latent or absent in Marcel’s and Binswanger’s intellectual undertakings. Perhaps, the Filipino *loob*, as understood by some of the Filipino scholars who have tried to mine its intersubjective treasure, will ‘heal’ the ‘wound of existential division’ created in the West and in westernized society, including the Philippines, by Descartes’ *Cogito*.

The concept the Filipino *loob* can be used in either literal or personal sense. The ‘literal’ pertains to the spatial or physical meaning of the word *loob*; what is literally inside or the ‘inside’ itself.<sup>63</sup> The use of the word is self-evident enough for one to catch its sense immediately. According to Leonardo Mercado, the conceptual equivalent of this in Visayan is *sulud* and in Ilocano is *uneg/loob*.<sup>64</sup>

When the word is used in its ‘personal’ sense or is applied to the *loob* of the person, however, the issue becomes messier or more complicated.

*Loob*, as explained by Mercado, can understood as “*sarili*” just like the Visayan *bunt* or Ilakano *nakem* which bears the notion of ‘selfhood’.<sup>65</sup> But, *loob* is not just *sarili* because according to Mercado, *loob* is specifically the dimension of the self that embodies the “essence” of the Filipino ‘cosmic self’.<sup>66</sup> *Loob*, as a ‘holistic’<sup>67</sup> and ‘cosmic’ concept, cannot be conceived in a compartmentalized way of thinking of the West because the Filipino *loob* encompasses the aspects of feeling, thinking and willing.<sup>68</sup> It is generally agreed, according to Mercado, that “[the] Filipino looks at, himself as a self, as one who feels, as one who wills, as one who thinks, as one who acts: as a total whole-as a ‘person,’ conscious of his freedom, proud of his human dignity, and sensitive to the violation of these two.”<sup>69</sup>

Aside from being characterized as ‘holistic’, Mercado argues that *loob* also pertains to a person’s ‘interiority,’ which is generally accepted by most Filipino scholars.<sup>70</sup> “*Loób*,” according to Vicente Rafael, “is at the root of one of the words for – to give, *ipagcaloób*, and a gift itself is *caloób*, literally part of the inside of something. Thus inside is juxtaposed rather than dialectically opposed to outside.”<sup>71</sup> Albert Alejo, however, underscores that “*loób*...cannot be encased only in a simplistic division between *loób* and *labas*.”<sup>72</sup> Jeremiah Reyes, in contrast to the general agreement on the *loob* as interiority, proposes a way of avoiding the pitfall of presenting *loob* as an ‘inner self’.” For him, it is more proper to understand *loob* not just a ‘will’ but as a ‘relational will’,<sup>73</sup> which clearly indicates the very important ‘milieu’ of relationality where the *loob* is ontologically situated. It is imperative, according to Reyes, “to distance *loob* from the modern conceptions of the will, such as the autonomous and self-legislating will found in Kant.”<sup>74</sup> ‘Autonomy’ or being an ‘isolated monad’, Reyes contends, is something that is foreign to the Filipino concept of *loob*, especially in its pre-modern or pre-colonial sense. *Loob* does not share the notion of the Cartesian *res cogitans* that is imprisoned in its monadic cell of solipsism. Because of this, Reyes avers that “[the] confusion starts when people latch on to [the] literal translation of *loób* as ‘inside’ and use all sorts of twentieth-century Western philosophical and psychological theories to explain *loób* with the subjective-objective dichotomy of Descartes or Kant looming in the background.”<sup>75</sup>

Although I am inclined to agree with Reyes in this respect, I believe that this ‘confusion’ will be a perennial problem should we insist

on using this Tagalog word which obviously shares the same exact word with the '*loob*' that we ordinarily use to refer to spatial or physical interiority, which, as I have already discussed earlier, is not carried by the Ilocano word '*nakem*'<sup>76</sup> and the Bicolano/Visayan word '*buot*' because these two regional linguistic families have different terminologies used to refer to physical interiority. Thus, it begs the question: Can we not just accept the notion of 'interiority' as indispensable aspect of the concept of Tagalog *loob* and never attempt at limiting *loob* purely or absolutely to the notion of "interior-less" 'will' alone? Perhaps, this is the reason why even if Leonardo Mercado strongly rejects the use of "either/or" category when referring to the Filipino notion of *loob* because it is located within the realm of 'holism' or of the 'both/and',<sup>77</sup> Miranda and Prospero Covar do not do away also with the idea of *com-penetration* of the inside and the outside.<sup>78</sup> Alejo's explanation of the concept of *loob* can be seen as a possible support to the argument of maintaining the notion of interiority in the Filipino *loob* because, according to him

The *loób* is not only the combination of the *lawak* (breadth) and *lalim* (depth) of the walls, floors, and eaves of a room but the *laman* (content) which are gathered in the center and that which moves from the center unto the corner and out into the front. *Loób* is also the surroundings that is composed of the sounds which are heard by the one who is knocking and not invading. The *loób* is that which is felt even in its silence which is understood when someone understands and shares that *loób*.<sup>79</sup>

This argument of Alejo, for me, conveys the same point expressed in Marcel's and Binswanger's notion of the 'self' which cannot be reduced to a disembodied Cartesian subject. The *loob* is a concretely embodied self that "is and will always be directed towards something, especially towards other people."<sup>80</sup> It should never be treated in isolation like an 'object' plucked out from its normal habitat because it is essentially immersed in a relational milieu or, "completely embedded and integrated inside the web of connectivity."<sup>81</sup>

In this web of connectivity, Jose de Mesa retains the importance of the *core of personhood* which is the *loob*. He succinctly explains that "Loób apart from referring to the core of personhood, also states what kind of core that is in relationship. Loób, one may say, is a relational understanding of the person in the lowland Filipino context."<sup>82</sup> Miranda, on his part,

affirms that “*Loob* needs *kapwa* even to be *loob*: its continued responding to *kapwa* is the condition for its own existence and authenticity as *loob*.”<sup>83</sup> It is meaningless, therefore to investigate the concept of *loob* (i.e., something about the ‘will’ of a person) like a monad which is detached or isolated from its organic relation to the *kapwa* and to the values and virtues that emanate from this ‘tandem’.

#### *What is ‘Inside’? Loob as Potentia*

Reyes suggests that a more proper way of understanding of the pre-modern Filipino *loob* is through the prism of Thomistic Virtue Ethics rather than simply looking at it from the lens of a Cultural Value. With this approach, according to him, one can rescue the concept of *loob* from the notion of shallow subjectivism or of a fleeting personal preference.<sup>84</sup> Using “Aquinas’ metaphysical doctrine of potency and act”, Reyes offers a corrective lens to explain how the notion of ‘inside’ can still be applied to the Filipino concept of *loob* which does not imply ‘interiority’ found in the modern subject.<sup>85</sup> ‘Inside’, according to Reyes, must be understood in the context of the Filipino *loob* as *potentia* (potency) like in the idea of a tree being “inside” the seed or the statue of David being “inside” the block of marble. In this logic, we can say that what has “always” been “inside” (i.e., hidden) was brought “outside” (i.e., actualized) by natural process of growth in the case of the tree and by the intervention of the sculptor in the case of the statue of David.<sup>86</sup> For Reyes, the *loob* of the person is more deeply understood not ‘through reflection’ but “by living in relationship with others” which embodies the essence of what Karol Wojtyla had expressed in the following words: “Action *reveals* the person... Action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of the person and allows us to understand the person most fully.”<sup>87</sup>

To borrow the words of Miranda, “*Loob* comes to be through its activity; without such activity *loob* is not; it does not exist.”<sup>88</sup> Thus, I can posit that the actualization of *loob*, whether it becomes a virtue like in the case of the *kagandahang loob* (i.e., benevolent will) or a vice like in the case of *masamang loob* (i.e., ill will) will certainly be influenced by the *how* and the *where* it is being nurtured and played out – whether in a hospitable or hostile environment, positive or negative, in an atmosphere of love or hate, harmony or divisiveness. Indeed, Reyes is right in saying that “the *loób* is known only through relationship and *interaction*. Even your own *loób*

cannot be determined by yourself in isolation, instead it is determined by how you relate and act towards your *kapwa*.”<sup>89</sup> Thus, the virtuous *loob* can be actualized in the healthy relational environment that includes the presence of the *kapwa*. This means that when the atmosphere is not conducive for cultivating virtues, the vicious *loob* gains the upper hand. The *loob* becomes a threat to the *kapwa*. The *loob* instead of fostering a loving relationship together with the *kapwa* becomes an instrument of division and destruction. Indeed, situations of alienation, tension and destruction creep in in the context of this intimate relationship which may water down or dissolve the bond that bring the *loob* and *kapwa* into a harmonious togetherness. One cannot simply turn a blind eye towards the “negative tendencies” that arise in this “loving” relationship. Despite being animated by the spirit of ‘intimacy and harmony’, they are still capable of harboring hatred and inflicting injury, suffering and death upon others, even to family members whom they consider as the core of their beings. The profound value they attach to relationship is certainly not a hundred percent guarantee that conflictual relationships are not sown by the *loob* in the field of intersubjectivity that could lead to bloody and deadly encounters.

*Kapwa’s Role in the Web of Relationality: The other side of the relational coin?*

An understanding of the concept of *loob* is gravely deficient if it is not viewed in tandem with another Filipino indigenous concept, which is the *kapwa*. In its literal sense, *kapwa* can either mean ‘fellow’ or ‘both’, which may express the notions of “sameness and relational-ness”.<sup>90</sup> Beyond its literal sense, however, *kapwa* is understood as “the core of Filipino personhood... the notion of a ‘shared self’ [which] extends to the I to include the Other,” according to Katrin de Guia.<sup>91</sup> *Kapwa*, as a ‘shared self’, in the words of De Guia, “bridges the deepest individual recess of a person with anyone outside him or herself, even total strangers.”<sup>92</sup> Enriquez, who has held almost the same cogitation of *kapwa* as de Guia, explains that

When asked for the closest English equivalent of *kapwa*, one word that comes to mind is the English word ‘others.’ However, the Filipino word *kapwa* is very different from the English word ‘others.’ In Filipino, *kapwa* is the unity of the ‘self’ and ‘others.’ The English ‘others’ is actually used

in opposition to the 'self,' and implies the recognition of the self as a separate identity. In contrast, *kapwa* is a recognition of shared identity, an inner self shared with others.<sup>93</sup>

Furthermore, he expounds that, indeed, the notion of intimacy is incumbent to relation of the *loob* and *kapwa* because "[the] *ako* (ego) and the *iba-sa-akin* (others) are one and the same in *kapwa* psychology: *Hindi ako iba sa aking kapwa* (I am no different from others). Once *ako* starts thinking of himself as separate from *kapwa*, the Filipino 'self' gets to be individuated in the Western sense and, in effect, denies the status of *kapwa* to the other. By the same token, the status of *kapwa* is also denied to the self."<sup>94</sup>

Reyes suggests that *kapwa* is best translated in English as "together with the person"<sup>95</sup> because it is meaningless to define *kapwa* on its own. For Reyes, there can be no other "starting point for *kapwa*" except in the context of 'togetherness'.<sup>96</sup> This brings to mind Ferriols who has beautifully captured this notion of intersubjectivity or togetherness in Tagalog: "nakikipagkapwa ang kalooban at kalooban."<sup>97</sup> It is so primordial that before one conceives of the unique identities of the *loob* and *kapwa* respectively, one experiences first and foremost the intimate bond shared by the self and the other.

At face value, it can be said that the Tagalog concept of *kapwa* bears some semblance to Levinas' *l'autre* or the *Du* in Buber. Exploring further than this skin-deep analogy, however, reveals that there are some attendant ideas that are not shared in common by these three relational concepts, but are individually held by each one. While Levinas' 'Other' is considered to be 'infinitely different' from the 'self', the Filipino *kapwa*, according to Reyes, is a being that is intimately tied to and profoundly known by the *loob* or self.<sup>98</sup> Thus, unlike the *loob-kapwa* tandem that is "defined" by the intimate link they share with one another, the 'self' and the '*l'autre*' is separated by the insurmountable chasm between them. This is also true for Martin Buber's *Du*, although it is seen as a "milder" version of Levinas' *l'autre*. According to Guevara, "Martin Buber basically agrees with Levinas in that the other is irreducible to any categories of thought set up by the ego. Buber recognizes the other's way of authentic existence as essentially different from the self."<sup>99</sup> Reyes, therefore, contends that

“for *kapwa* relationship is the given, it is taken for granted. It is the starting point, not something to be retrieved.”<sup>100</sup>

What resembles *kapwa* more, Reyes opines, is the ‘*communio personarum*’<sup>101</sup> that both Norris Clarke<sup>102</sup> and Karol Wojtyla have expressed in their respective philosophical treatises. This is so, because Norris Clarke, as per evaluation of Reyes, continues of the legacy of Thomas Aquinas philosophy that sees being or the human person as “*substance-in-relation*”.<sup>103</sup> But Clarke, taking the discourse further, claims that “To be an authentic person, in a word, is to be a *lover*, to live a life of *inter-personal* self-giving and receiving. Person is essentially a ‘we’ term. Person exists in its fullness only in the plural.”<sup>104</sup> Wojtyla, on his part, understands the ‘we’ relationship as ‘participation’.<sup>105</sup> What seems to be a problem in Wojtyla’s notion of participation is the “strong emphasis” he has given to the “subjective ‘I’” which does not sit well with the Filipino notion of *loob-kapwa*.<sup>106</sup>

Speaking of which, I find Barasab Nicolescu’s notion of the “included middle” particularly enlightening. Although this concept stems from the region of quantum physics, it can instruct us not only in the area of transdisciplinarity but also in our understanding of the peculiar relationship between the *loob-kapwa*. Nicolescu notes that transdisciplinary, as an approach, deals with a reality whose realm is multi-dimensional yet coherent, wherein the level of non-contradiction (i.e., T-state) can co-exist with a level of contradiction (i.e., A and non-A). With this explanation, we learn from Nicolescu that the “included middle” expresses non-contradictoriness or mutual inclusivity wherein the notions of “true” and “false” are expanded “in such a way that the rules of logical implication no longer concerning two terms (A and non-A) but three terms (A, non-A and T), co-existing at the same moment in time... *The logic of the included middle is the privileged logic of complexity*, privileged in the sense that it allows us to cross the different areas of knowledge in a coherent way, by enabling a new kind of simplicity.”<sup>107</sup>

This does not imply, however, that the opposite (i.e., “logic of excluded middle”) is categorically denied or taken out of the picture. Instead, what happens is a narrowing down of the validity of the scope which “the logic of the excluded middle” traditionally held. This means to say that “the logic of the excluded middle” cannot be applied in all



circumstances since it is only valid, according to Nicolescu, “for relatively simple situation”.<sup>108</sup> He contends that when “the logic of excluded middle” is absolutized and universalized, it becomes harmful, especially when placed in the “complex” and “transdisciplinary cases”.<sup>109</sup>

On this note, I believe that it is possible to understand the peculiar relationship of *loob-kapwa* from the prism of the ‘included middle’, because in this relationship, as understood by most of the Filipino scholars which we will explain in more detail later on, the *loob* and the *kapwa* are not identical but at the same time they are intimately linked to one another – they are physically seen as separate or discrete entities but on another level, the realm of relationality, they are construed or experienced as united. Thus, while it affirms the logic  $A$  is not equal to  $\neg A$ , because their apparent distinctness, it does not negate their complex togetherness, that is, the *loob* and the *kapwa* can contemporaneously reside or harmoniously co-exist in each person, without also denying that they are two different entities. This unique *loob-kapwa* relationship can also be translated to how, as far as traditional Filipino consciousness is concerned, the confluence of the spirit and the human worlds. This explains why within the Filipino worldview there is an intimate link between the sacred and the profane as well as the closeness of the human and the divine, which is unfortunately mistakenly labeled as split-level Christianity by Bulatao.<sup>110</sup>

### **Marcel and Binswanger Finding a “Homeland” in the Filipino *Loob*?**

Seeing the closeness between Binswanger’s and Marcel’s notions of communion, notwithstanding their differences, I also perceive a possible converging point between them and the Filipino concept of “*loob*” (relational will) that is intimately linked with the “*kapwa*” (together with the person) as understood by Reyes. Although the “twin” concepts of *loob* and *kapwa* are a peculiar result of the fusion of Southeast Asian tribal-animist Filipino and Spanish Catholic traditions, I believe that the united forces of Binswanger, Marcel and the Filipino *loob* can prove that the Cartesian solipsistic ego, carried over by Heidegger’s *Dasein*, is not the irreducible existential fact. In other words, the solipsistic ego is untenable. This ‘trio’ strongly affirms that the real ontological *factum* is the togetherness of the

I-thou and not Descartes' "I think I am" or Heidegger's "I am dying." Binswanger and Marcel both locate this togetherness in the realm of love: Binswanger proposes that *love* is an experience of unity and infinity and Marcel posits that when one says "I love you" he/she is also saying "You shall not die."

These western articulations of love, in my opinion, can find a hospitable home in the Filipino "*loob-kapwa*" tandem as I have demonstrated earlier using the philosophical proposals of Reyes, Miranda, Mercado and the like, because the very essence of these concepts (i.e., *loob* as a relational will and *kapwa* as together with the person), when actualized by the players in the field of intersubjectivity, will weather any destructive bifurcation thrown into the path of *loob-kapwa* by the *Modern* way of thinking rooted in the solipsistic Cartesian ego. The *loob-kapwa* is a strong affirmation of intersubjectivity and communion.<sup>111</sup> That is why, according to Dionisio Miranda, "*Loob* needs *kapwa* even to be *loob*: its continued responding to the *kapwa* is the condition for its own existence and its authenticity as *loob*."<sup>112</sup> In other words, the absence of the *kapwa* renders the self or the *loob* inauthentic.

In the language of Binswanger, it is called 'being-together-at-home-in-the-world.' Marcel refers to this as the "mystery of communion" located in the "being-in-situation". Conceptually, as I have already explained earlier, there is no dichotomy between what is within and without in the Filipino understanding of *loob*. *Loob*, which is not perceived as a disembodied self, is always directed at something or someone. According to Reyes, "*Loob* is only what it is in so far as it is completely embedded and integrated inside the web of connectivity."<sup>113</sup> A person seen against the background of the Filipino worldview cannot be a genuine person without his/her recognition of one's shared identity or of what di Guia referred to as 'people-centered orientation'<sup>114</sup> Moreover, the Filipino *kapwa*, as earlier indicated, is not similar to the English concept of 'others' which is diametrically opposed to the 'self'. Therefore, the Filipino *loob-kapwa*, in its 'ordinary' sense, retains the primordial unity of the I and the thou. For, indeed, in *kapwa*, as I have already quoted earlier from Reyes, "relationship is the given. It is taken for granted. It is the starting point, not something to be retrieved."<sup>115</sup>

This is the reason why the fullness of personhood (what is considered in the West as self-realization) is found in the Filipino expression of *pagkakaisa* (oneness), which according to Enriquez is the “highest level of interpersonal interaction possible... a full realization of *pakikipagkapwa*.”<sup>116</sup> Hence, the twin commandments found in the Scriptures that express love for God and love for neighbor as oneself is not significantly alien to the Filipino person. It is the very context of his/her existence, which perhaps explains the religiosity of the Filipinos.

It is interesting to note, at this point, that the Filipino *kapwa* is ambivalent in terms of number. It does not reveal immediately (unlike the words I, self and other) whether it pertains to just one or many. It can be singular or plural. It is also true even in the concept of *kapwa*. Therefore, there is an inherent openness to other others. It does not allow itself to be trapped in *solitude á deux*. Naturally, it does not require an escape route needed by Marcel and Binswanger in their respective intersubjective journeys.

Aside from this, the Filipino *loob*, unlike Marcel who starts from the ‘broken world’ and Binswanger who begins with the *misglücken*, is situated in a primordial harmonious diversity.<sup>117</sup> Thus, it is already immersed in what Binswanger considers as unity of identity and difference and in what Marcel calls as creative tension in the mystery of being.

I feel, however, that the Filipino *loob-kapwa* lies closer to Marcel than to Binswanger, because of its openness to the Transcendent, to the Divine. The *kapwa* of the *loob* is not only limited to the human entities but is also extended to the spiritual entities that ordinarily inhabit the traditional Filipino worldview.<sup>118</sup> Thus, the Filipino *loob* is predisposed to an encounter with the Absolute Thou that Marcel discovers in his pilgrimage to the mystery of being. In fact, for a Filipino person, the interpenetration of the divine, human person and other/s is already a given. It is the starting point. It is also the end-point.

Beyond this comparative work that I have done concerning Marcel, Binswanger, and the Filipino *loob-kapwa* which is mostly derived from the philosophical exploration of Jeremiah Reyes, there is another philosophical or theological avenue that can be pursued. This theological trail which has already been initially blazed by Jose de Mesa and Levy Lara Lanaria endeavors to establish a conceptual link between the Filipino *loob-*

*kapwa* tandem and the mystery of the Christian Trinitarian God – a unity in diversity.

Jose de Mesa, has introduced into the ongoing theological discourse on inculturation the possibility of using *loob* as a platform for providing a glimpse of the mystery of God's love through the native expression *kagandahang-loob*.<sup>119</sup> This "culturally appropriate category" can be dynamically translated to English as "winsome benevolence of God" that brings together into a creative blend the notions of beauty, goodness and will. This concept of *kagandahang-loob*, according to de Mesa, will make the mystery of God's love more comprehensible to ordinary Filipino faithful whose worldview conceptually grasps the meaning of *loob* as "the inner self... the core of one's personhood and where the true worth of a person lies".<sup>120</sup> Coupled with the notions of "beauty and goodness", *kagandahang-loob* reveals also the Christian God, whose fullness of revelation comes in the Person of Jesus Christ, the *kagandahang-loob par excellence*, the pure goodness which is, according to de Mesa as quoted by Bevans in *Theology in Global Perspective*, "not cold, but warm, a kindness which is not enslaving, but liberating."<sup>121</sup> This *kagandahang-loob*, for Albert Alejo, is similar to the notion of *kabaitan* which also means benevolence or "*kabutibang walang daya*" (i.e., "goodness without deceit").<sup>122</sup> Looking at it from the perspective of the Filipino *loob-kapwa*, it is possible to see God who is the Omnipotent Creator and the perfection of *kagandahang-loob* as the very well-spring of the *loob* of the human person who is continuously being sustained and inspired by this Absolute Source (i.e., God) so that the human person will actualize his/her *kagandahang-loob* that reflects God's image and likeness. And this God who is pure *kagandahang-loob* never ceases to invite people to constantly remain in the loving and life-giving relationship with God as a manifestation of *kagandahang-loob*. Outside this relation, love definitely fades and life certainly perishes.

The idea that God indefatigably offers to the human person an invitation to enter into the mystery of communion shared by the Three Divine Persons with each other, is also the very basis for Levy Lara Lanaria's theological proposal to reflect on how the Bible, especially in the Book of Genesis, reveals "a relational God-within" who has/have projected to or implanted in the human persons the relational bond of the *loob-kapwa*.<sup>123</sup>

The One True God that we have, according to him, is not a lonely and isolated God but a God who is a loving community, a God whose “*loob* is essentially an intra-relational self” – a ‘Trinity’. By uttering the words “let *us* make the human person according to *our* image and likeness (Gen. 2:7),” God reveals God’s intention of making communion (unity in diversity) as the *raison d’être* of every human being. This becomes clearly demonstrated in what the Filipinos consider as the value of *pakikipagkapwa* which is practiced mostly by the members of biological families and ecclesial communities. In other words, these human relations mirror a faint but genuine image of the Trinitarian God who is ‘the’ most real *Loob-Kapwa* or the *Pakikipagkapwa par excellence*.<sup>124</sup> In this framework, we understand that the *dynamics* of “intra-relationships” that transpires within God’s *loob* is, thereby, lovingly and freely shared (*mapagmahal at malayang ipinagkakaloob*) by God to God’s created beings (i.e., human-beings).<sup>125</sup> This, I believe, is also the meaning of *Immanuel* - the God with us, the God who will not abandon us even if a mother forgets her child – because God’s Divine *Loob* is already embedded in the *loob* of the human persons. God’s *Loob* is perceived by Filipinos as being intimately married into our *loob* as human beings, that is why, generally, Filipinos do not have a problem in declaring their profound trust in the *kalooban ng Diyos* (God’s will) because the innermost depth of our being (*kaloob-looban*) is believed to conform to the *Loob* of God. Indeed, as far as Filipino religious worldview is concerned, our innermost being simply echoes what is “in the heart” of God: God’s *kalooban* (God’s will) is ultimately our *kalooban* (the human person’s will) when we listen carefully and truthfully to what the deepest core of our being is telling us. Filipinos, in general, believe that God’s *kalooban* is not capable of harming the human beings who are created in the God’s image and likeness. The human beings are, indeed, the *loob* who are the *kapwa* of God who is the perfection of *Loob-Kapwa* community. The challenge, therefore, is for the human beings to strive to constantly be attuned to God’s Divine *Loob* in order for them not to lose sight of their real purpose in life which is to be a communion of persons who respect, love and support each other as they journey together towards the common goal of communal, as well as individual, self-actualization. Speaking more specifically about the relationship between the Trinity and the community of God’s creatures, Lanaria says that

The Christian theological tradition has given names to the three-in-one God: Father, Son and Spirit. Within the innermost Triune *loob* is a dynamic interaction of coequal persons in perfect unity. Christians normally commune with the Triune God through Jesus Christ the one mediator between God and humankind...If God is *kagandahang-loob* (winsome benevolence; love), then Jesus Christ...is God's *kagandahang-loob*. To be united with the Triune God is to be united with and through Jesus Christ-God who had 'gone down' from the Spirit world and became our *kapwa*-in-corporeality. The union with Jesus...'is an intrinsic one, based on an ontological reality' wherein he "communicates his life, his being to (them) from an innermost dwelling place within (their) being" thus enabling them to be animated by his Spirit and to live in him.<sup>126</sup>

Thus, I argue that the Filipino indigenous concept of *loob-kapwa* does not only enrich Marcel's and Binswanger's respective notions of intersubjectivity because it tries to underpin the intimate relationship that binds the self and the other which was greatly afflicted by the establishment of the Cartesian ego, but at the same time, it provides a stepping stone towards an assent to the Trinitarian God who is the *loob-kapwa par excellence* – a unity in diversity, A Divine Being who is Three Persons in one God.

### **Triangulation of Marcel, Binswanger and *Loob*: A Possible Response to the Challenge of Contemporary Theology**

To conclude, despite the divergences that we discover between Marcel, Binswanger and the Filipino *loob* as expressed mostly by Reyes, it can still be asserted that these three will definitely be at home with each other. The convergence that we find in them, I believe, helps one to confront the issue of theology in the context of the postmodern world. Enlightened by them, I am given some pointers on how to do theology in the midst of multiplicity and alterity – taking advantage of the richness of intersubjectivity and interreligious/ecumenical/non-denominational dialogues, because existence is co-existence and theology is better done in the encounter of multiplicity and alterity. It is a multiplicity in the context of communion. It is alterity that is rooted in relationship. Personally, the combination of Marcel, Binswanger and the Filipino *loob* allows me to have a glimpse of the reality of the Trinitarian God who is a *unity of identity and difference*, a *mysterious community of creative tension*, and a *relational will* who is at the same time *together with the person*.

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### Endnotes:

- 1 For Gabriel Marcel, to exist *existentially* means to exist not simply as a body (i.e., to exist problematically) but to exist as a thinking, emotive being dependent upon human creative impulse. He asserts, "As soon as there is creation, we are in the realm of being," and also that, "There is no sense using the word 'being' except where creation is in view". Gabriel Marcel, "Les Menace de Guerre," eds. Joël Bouëssée and Anne Marcel, in *Gabriel Marcel Et les injustices de ce Temps: La Responsabilité du Philosophe*, Presence de Gabriel Marcel, cahier 4 (Paris: Aubier, 1983) xiii. Cf also James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, eds., "Gabriel Marcel (1889—1973)," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/marcel/> [accessed December 22, 2014]. Cf. also Gabriel Marcel, *Creative Fidelity*, trans. and intro. Robert Rosthal (New York: Fordham University, 2002) 136.
- 2 He is a decidedly *unsystematic* thinker.
- 3 According to Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The philosophical approach known as existentialism is commonly recognized for its view that life's experiences and interactions are meaningless. Many existentialist thinkers are led to conclude that life is only something to be tolerated, and that close or intimate relationships

- with others should be avoided.” Fieser and Dowden, “Gabriel Marcel”.
- 4 Commitment, for Sartre, is “based on the strength of the solitary decisions made by individuals who have committed themselves fully to personal independence”. Fieser and Dowden, “Gabriel Marcel”.
  - 5 Nigel Warburton explains that “For Sartre ‘abandonment’ means specifically abandonment by God. This does not imply that God as a metaphysical entity actually existed at some point, and went away: Sartre is echoing Nietzsche’s famous pronouncement: ‘God is dead’. Nietzsche did not mean that God had once been alive, but rather that the belief in God was no longer a tenable position in the late nineteenth century. By using the word ‘abandonment’ in a metaphorical way Sartre emphasizes the sense of loss caused by the realization that there is no God to warrant our moral choices, no divinity to give us guidelines as to how to achieve salvation. The choice of word stresses the solitary position of human beings alone in the universe with no external source of objective value.” **Nigel Warburton**, “A Student’s Guide to Jean-Paul Sartre’s, Existentialism and Humanism,” *Philosophy Now* 15 (1996):27-31, [https://philosophynow.org/issues/15/A\\_students\\_guide\\_to\\_Jean-Paul\\_Sartres\\_Existentialism\\_and\\_Humanism](https://philosophynow.org/issues/15/A_students_guide_to_Jean-Paul_Sartres_Existentialism_and_Humanism) [accessed December 23, 2014].
  - 6 Warburton explains that “Despair, like abandonment and anguish, is an emotive term. Sartre means by it simply the existentialist’s attitude to the recalcitrance or obstinacy of the aspects of the world that are beyond our control (and in particular other people: in his play *No Exit* one of the characters declares ‘Hell is other people’). Whatever I desire to do, other people or external events may thwart. The attitude of despair is one of stoic indifference to the way things turn out: “When Descartes said ‘Conquer yourself rather than the world’, what he meant was, at bottom, the same – that we should act without hope.” **Warburton**, “A Student’s Guide” 39. We cannot rely on anything which is outside our control, but this does not mean we should abandon ourselves to inaction: on the contrary, Sartre argues that it should lead us to commit ourselves to a course of action since there is no reality except in action. As Sartre puts it: ‘The genius of Proust is the totality of the works of Proust.’ (pp.41-2) – everyone is wholly defined by what they actually do rather than by what they might have done had circumstances been different. For Sartre there are no ‘mute inglorious Miltons.’” **Warburton**, “A Student’s Guide.”
  - 7 Kenneth Gallagher, *The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel* (New York: Fordham University, 1975) 8.
  - 8 Cf. Joe McCown, *Availability: Gabriel Marcel and the Phenomenology of Human Openness: AAR Studies in Religion* (Montana: Scholars, 1978) 44.
  - 9 According to Gabriel Marcel, “Philosophy will always... be an aid to discovery rather than a matter of strict demonstration.” Gabriel Marcel, *Le Mystere de l’Etre*, vol. 1, *Reflexion et Myster* (Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1951) 2. Roque Ferriols, on his part, says in Tagalog: *Kaya’t ang importante ay dumanas, magmasid, kumilatis: isang mapagdamang pag-aapuhap sa talagang meron. Hindi na ngayon kagandahan ng sariling isip, kundi kabagsikan ng hindi ko ginawa ang umiiral sa kalooban ko, at pumapaligid at tumatalab sa akin. Iyan ang unang yugto sa pagbigkas sa meron.*” It is difficult to translate these words to English, but essentially what Ferriols would like to say is that in order for one to properly philosophize, must immerse oneself in the concrete realities of life to experience, observe and assess what being is. Groping for what being is involves all the senses of the human being. It is not about the brilliance of one’s mind, but about the fierceness of what exists, surrounds and impinges on me that



does not originate from me. Furthermore, Ferriols claims that “[sa] pag-aapuhap na ganito, ginagamit ang mga konsepto; ngunit, sapagkat ang paghibilig sa meron ang nagpapairal sa pagdanas, pagmasid at pangingilatis, hindi konsepto ang hari, kundi meron.... Ang konsepto ay kailangang maging angkop: angkop sa meron. At kung hindi angkop ay kailangang itaboy at palitan ng angkop sa meron.” (In this quest one makes use of concepts; however, because one’s ‘inclination’ to being is what gives dynamism to experiencing, observing and assessing, concepts are not kings, but being.... A concept must conform to what is being. And when it does not, it simply must be discarded and be replaced by a new one.) Ferriols, *Pambungad sa Metapisika*, 112.

- 10 Gabriel Marcel, *Awakenings*, trans. Peter Rogers (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2002) 131.
- 11 Marcel pictures himself as a philosopher in search of a concrete philosophy characterized by mystery, being, love, faith incarnation, communion, transcendence, availability and hope whose philosophical journey/pilgrimage has no end but only a beginning. Marcel, Gabriel. Concrete Philosophy of Marcel is more of a voyage of discovery rather than a series of logical, epistemological, and metaphysical arguments. Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, trans. Emma Craufurd (Chicago: Harper & Row, 1965).
- 12 Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *Man Against Mass Society*, trans. G.S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962).
- 13 Marcel, *Homo Viator*, 140.
- 14 Cf. Gabriel Marcel, *Problematic Man*, trans. Brian Thompson (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967).
- 15 Marcel claims that “all spiritual life is essentially a dialogue,” which according to him means, “the relationship that can be said to be spiritual is that of being with being... What really matters is spiritual commerce between beings, and that involves not respect but love.” Gabriel Marcel, *Metaphysical Journal*, trans. Bernard Wall (Chicago, IL: Regnery, 1952; London: Rockliff, 1952) 137 and 211.
- 16 From a letter written by Hocking in 1920. Cited in Leroy J. Rouner, *Within Human Experience: The Philosophy of William Ernest Hocking* (New York: Harvard University, 1969) 41.
- 17 Marcel states: “It must therefore be well understood that the faithful soul is destined to experience darkness...Fidelity is not a preliminary *datum*, it is revealed and established as fidelity by this very crossing of darkness, by this trial combined with everyday life.” Marcel, *Homo Viator*, 140.
- 18 Marcel, *Homo Viator*, 60.
- 19 My knowledge on Binswanger is considerably dependent on Schrijvers’ texts used in a doctoral seminar at the Faculty of Theology of KU Leuven – Belgium, especially chapters 9 and 10. Thus, the citations in this article will follow its original format instead of the one published by SUNY in 2016. Originally, the title of what was then a forthcoming book was *From Love to Life?: Toward a Contemporary Phenomenology of Religious Life* but when it was finally published it was changed to *Between Faith and Belief: Toward a Contemporary Phenomenology of Life*. Cf. Joeri Schrijvers, *Between Faith and Belief: Toward a Contemporary Phenomenology of Life* (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2016).
- 20 When Gabriel Marcel wrote his “Metaphysical Journal” he did not know Martin Buber, despite the convergence between their ideas, because Marcel came from



an intellectual tradition, at that time, far removed from the German academic atmosphere. Emmanuel Levinas, *Outside the Subject* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1993) 20. The war deeply impacted Gabriel Marcel that it was during that tragic period that many of Marcel's important philosophical themes would take root. In fact, the journal that he kept during the war became the framework of his first book *Metaphysical Journal* (1927). Cf. Fieser and Dowden, "Gabriel Marcel." In contrast to Marcel, Binswanger's phenomenology of love is heavily influenced by Martin Buber. In fact, it is also well known that Binswanger entered into a lifelong friendship with Buber who considered the issue intersubjectivity as central to his entire philosophy. In Schrijvers' account it is mentioned that Binswanger's monumental *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* was written in a time of war.

- 21 Cf. Simon Taylor, "Applied Philosophy, Applied Psychiatry: Ludwig Binswanger and the Birth of Existential Analysis," in *New Practices of Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University, 2011) 3. Cf. also Frank Sulloway, *Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend* (New York: Harvard University, 1979). Cf. also Ludwig Binswanger, "The Existential Analysis School of Thought", in *Existence*, trans. Ernest Angel, eds. Rollo May, Ernest Angel, & Henri Ellenberger (New York: Basic Books, 1958) 191. Ludwig Binswanger, "Heidegger's Analytic of Existence and Its Meaning for Psychiatry", in *Being-in-the-World: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger*, trans. Jacob Needleman (New York: Basic Books, 1963) 211.
- 22 Cf. Roger Frie, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Modern Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: A Study of Sartre, Binswanger, Lacan, and Habermas* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) 79. Brian Koehler, "Ludwig Binswanger: Contributions to an Intersubjective Approach to Psychosis (December 25, 2004)", in *International Society for Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis*, United States Chapter, <http://www.isps-us.org/koehler/binswanger.htm> [accessed: December 22, 2014]. Schrijvers explains that "Death, for Binswanger, undergoes a displacement: it no longer occupies the prime place as it does in Heidegger's existential analytic receives its meaning as an 'erotic phenomenon.'" Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 374.
- 23 Cf. Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971).
- 24 Schrijvers explains that Binswanger did not just criticize Heidegger's *Dasein* but he also attempted "to extend Heidegger's insights in *Dasein*'s relation with the world to the domain of sick subjectivities or what he calls '*misgückten*', failed or false *Dasein*." Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 318.
- 25 Binswanger, "The Existential Analysis," 192.
- 26 Frie, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity*, 89, Frie noted that "[according] to Buber, the character of a relation is determined by which of the basic words is spoken: when I-Thou is said, the I is different from the I that speaks the primary word I-It." He adds, "Binswanger follows Buber in arguing that human relations are by their essential nature dialogical (not simply referring to a linguistic mode, rather to a basic structure of human existence - currently, this is being mapped in infant research by such theorists as Trevarthen in Scotland." Frie, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity*, 89. See Colwyn Trevarthen "The Self Born in Intersubjectivity: The Psychology of an Infant Communicating" in *The Perceived Self: Ecological and Interpersonal Sources of self-Knowledge*, ed. Ulric Neisser (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993).
- 27 Frie, *Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity*, 106.

- 28 Ludwig Binswanger, "On the manic mode of being-in-the-world," in *Phenomenology: Pure and Applied*, ed. Erwin W. Straus (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1964) 134.
- 29 According to Giovanni Stranghellini, "Jasper's incomprehensibility is the effect of de-personalized understanding." Cf. Giovanni Stranghellini, *Disembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies: The Psychopathology of Common Sense* (England: Oxford University, 2004) 29.
- 30 The I and thou relationship is not similar but a contrast to the subject-object relationship. For Binswanger, the mutual relationship of love, the dual mode of love, constitutes the most original and 'highest' form of human existence.
- 31 Binswanger, *Being-in-the-World*, 177.
- 32 Binswanger, "The Existential Analysis," 193-94. Binswanger further states: "the much-discussed *gap* that separates our 'world' from the 'world' of the mentally ill and makes communication between the two so difficult is not only scientifically explained but also scientifically bridged by existential analysis." Binswanger, "The Existential Analysis," 213.
- 33 Taylor, "Applied Philosophy, Applied Psychiatry," 7. Cf also Ludwig Binswanger, *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* (Heidelberg: Roland Asanger, 2004) 69, 134. Binswanger, *Being-in-the-World*, 337-338. Binswanger, "Existential Analysis", 82.
- 34 Binswanger, "The Existential Analysis," 194.
- 35 In Marcel's understanding, "love does not deny death, but is it affirmation of the fact that death is not the end, because death does not close of the other and the end of one's love to the departed one. Marcel believes that "the only dead are those whom we no longer love". Gabriel Marcel, *Presence and Immortality*, trans. M.A. Machado (Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University, 1967) 277.
- 36 Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 337. According to Schrijvers, "The horror of death... differs in a remarkable way from other interruptions of love, such as infidelity, for if in such suspensions the love of lovers comes, more often than not, to a halt, the death of one of the lovers does not mean the end of the loving 'we'." Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 374.
- 37 Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 317. See also Ludwig Binswanger, "Brief von Binswanger and Richard Hönigswald, 6 February 1947," in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, ed. M. Herzog, *Ausgewählte Werke* (Heidelberg: Asanger, 1994) 316.
- 38 Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 318. For an extended discussion on Binswanger phenomenology of love, please refer to pp. 328- 338.
- 39 Cf. Marcel, *Metaphysical Journal*, 139, 137. Please see Gabriel Marcel, *The Existential Background of Human Dignity* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1963) 41. For Binswanger's notion of concreteness please see Rollo May and Irvin Yalom, "Existential Psychology," in *Current Psychotherapies*, eds. Raymond Corsini and Danny Wedding (Itasca, IL: Peacock 1989) 366.
- 40 Marcel, *Le Mystere de l' Etre*, 41. This philosophy is a sort of "description bearing upon the structures which reflection elucidates starting from experience." Marcel, *Man Against Mass Society*, 180. Marcel expressed a refreshing preference for philosophizing in ordinary language. He maintained that "we should employ current forms of ordinary language which distort our experiences far less than the elaborate expressions in which philosophical language is crystallized" Marcel, *Homo Viator*, 158. Despite the fact that he does not label his brand of philosophy as a

phenomenology, which Binswanger openly endorses, Marcel's approach traverses the same stream as Binswanger, because his preference for the concrete philosophy that speaks in ordinary language allows him to begin many of his philosophical essays with an observation about life and experience.

- 41 In a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Episcopal Theological School, Richard Rowe introduced Daseinsanalysis in the following words: "*Daseinsanalyse* is the peculiar creation of Ludwig Binswanger. Binswanger borrowed *Dasein* [Being (*Sein*) there (Da)] from the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger. To this concept he added a neo-Freudian psycho-'analysis'... *Daseinsanalyse* was Binswanger's attempt to complement and broaden the view of man and his experience of living which was implicit in Freudian psychoanalysis. The experience which Binswanger wanted to introduce into psychiatry (and which Freud said must not be included) is the experience of transcendence, that is, the feeling of spirit, or love." Richard Rowe, "The Daseinsanalyse of Ludwig Binswanger and the Biblical Concept of Agape: A Treatise on the Creative Power of Love in Psychotherapy" (unpublished thesis, Faculty of Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, MA, 1966) IV-V.
- 42 Marcel, *Le Mystere de l' Etre*, 41. According to Schrijvers, "Binswanger... is much more aware of the back and forth of the ontic and the ontological, and considers the former as the only legitimate passage-way to the latter without one being able to dismiss the former completely." Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 339.
- 43 Marcel, *Creative Fidelity*, 65;
- 44 Marcel, *The Existential Background*, 82-83.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 26.
- 46 Deurzen-Smith, *Everyday Mysteries*, 147. Deurzen-Smith is an existential psychotherapist at Regent's College in London and someone who is responsible for the contemporary resurgence of this approach in the London school of existential analysis.
- 47 "I should like to start," Marcel says, "with a sort of global and intuitive characterization of the man in whom the sense of the ontological—the sense of being, is lacking, or, to speak more correctly, the man who has lost awareness of this sense." A world in which "ontological exigence"—if it is acknowledged at all—is silenced by an unconscious relativism or by a monism that discounts the personal, "ignores the tragic and denies the transcendent." Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Carol, 1995) 9, 15.
- 48 Gabriel Marcel, *Tragic Wisdom and Beyond (with conversations between Paul Ricoeur and Gabriel Marcel)*, trans. Stephen Jolin and Peter McCormick (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1973) 44.
- 49 Bernd Becher, Hilla Becher and Thuerry de Duve, *Grundformen*, vol. 40 of Schirmer's visuelle Bibliothek (n.p.: Schirmer/Mosel, 1993) 107, "schaut *Desin* [...] sich als *Mitdasein* an". Cf. Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 341.
- 50 Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 341.
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 Marcel states: "Love is faith itself, an invincible assurance based on Being itself. It is here and her alone that we reach not only an unconditioned fact but a rational unconditional as well; namely that of the Absolute Thou, that which is expressed in the *Fiat voluntas tua* of the Lord's Prayer." Marcel, "Les Menace de Guerre," 136.
- 53 Marcel, *Gabriel Being and Having* (New York: Harper & Row, 1949) 79.

- 54 Transcendence for Marcel is understood as “trans-ascendence”. He insists that ‘transcendent’ cannot mean ‘transcending experience.’ Cf. Marcel, *Le Mystere de l’Etre*, 46.
- 55 Marcel, *Man Against Mass Society*, 259.
- 56 Donald McCarthy, “Marcel’s Absolute Thou,” *Philosophy Today* 10(1966): 178.
- 57 Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 341-342. Schrijvers explains that “The meeting of lovers is the crossing between (ontic) encounter and the (ontological) *Urbegegnung*, between our together (*Wir beide*) and togetherness in general (*überhaupt*) or ... it is my being drawn to you because of the universal enticement that rages through being and presences between all beings.” Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 340.
- 58 According to Joeri Schrijvers, Binswanger did so because of the climate of the period. Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*,
- 59 Schrijvers, *From Love to Life?*, 346.
- 60 According to Dionisio Miranda, “Loob is a Filipino term rich in many meanings, as found in its various cognates or derivatives. Consider, for example, these terms: looban, kalooban, pagloloob, panloloob, pinaglooban, pinakaloob, kaloob-looban, kaloob, loobin, pagbabalik-loob, kusang-loob, kapalagayang-loob, lamang-loob, kabutihang-loob, kasamaang-loob, utang na loob, buong-loob, tamang-loob, maling-loob, malakas ang loob, mahina ang loob, maruming loob, malinis na loob, maliit na loob, malaking loob, sirang-loob, maayos na loob, panloob, etc. Because of this there is more than a little truth to the observation that loob is initially best described rather than defined” Dionisio Miranda, *Loob: The Filipino Within* (Manila: Divine Word, 1989) 1. For Jeremiah Reyes, the proper way of understanding *loob* is not through the lens of a value which Kluckhohn defines as “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action.” Clyde Kluckhohn, “Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action,” in *Towards a General Theory of Action*, eds. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1951) 395. “To call something a value,” Reyes contends, “is to describe a positive attitude towards it. It does not say what it is, but only that it is considered good, desirable, or important.” Jeremiah Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa: Thomas Aquinas and a Filipino Virtue Ethics” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, KU, Leuven, 2015). He states that “In the language of Aquinas, a virtue (or vice) is a habit that is specific to a rational human being. It cannot be just any object that is perceived by the mind as good. There is justification in advocating for a Filipino virtue ethics because the Filipino language contains a word which, one can say, contains an entire virtue ethics within it: the concept of loób. The loób is the “holistic and relational will” of a person. It is the proper subject of the Filipino virtues, which renders it the most often recurring term for compound virtue words.” Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa,” 73. Reyes proposes that “*loob* is the most obvious key term in Filipino virtue ethics... is the subject of the virtues; it is what the virtues affect and modify.” Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa.” 73..
- 61 Albert E. Alejo, *Tao po! Tuloy!: Isang Landas ng Pag-unawa sa Loob ng Tao* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Office of Research and Publications, 1990). The extensive catalogue of 287 *loob*’s meaning and its variants are found in the Appendix of this book entitled “*Kayamanan ng Loob*” (literally, Riches of Loob). Alejo’s collection come from various sources, such as dictionaries (both old and new), academic (e.g., theology, sociology, philosophy, psychology) and non-academic (e.g., sayings, narratives, casual conversations) sources.

- 62 Cf. René Descartes, *Meditations On First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies*, Latin-English Version, ed. and trans. John Cottingham (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 64.
- 63 Jacobo explains that “[one] must be acquainted with the word for the interior—*loób*. This interior may be that of a house, *loób ng bahay*, or a community, *Loóban*. *Loób* may also refer to the self’s intricate psychological chambers. *Kaloóban* is a variation, but because of the agglutination interestingly transliterates as the – virtue of interiority. *Kaloób-loóban*, in its repetition of the rootword, depicts a labyrinthine self, implying an innermost quarter, a core space for a private thought or an intimate feeling. The architectural trope extends to the language of corporeality. *Lamang-loób* refers to one’s – inner flesh. Jayson Pilapil Jacobo, “Mood of Metaphor: Tropicality and Time in the Philippine Poetic” (unpublished dissertation, Stony Brook University, New York, 2011) 40-41.
- 64 Leonardo Mercado, S.V.D., “Reflections on Buut-Loob-Nakem,” *Philippine Studies* 20, no. 4 (1972): 580.
- 65 Mercado, “Reflections on Buut-Loob-Nakem,” 596. In this article Mercado provided some common English meanings that are attached to these three indigenous terminologies: motive, intention, mind, reason, understanding, perception, judgment, decision, consciousness, conscience, awareness, wish, desire, will, state of mind, disposition, mood, volition, courage, valor, etc. Mercado, “Reflections on Buut-Loob-Nakem,” 582-590.
- 66 The Tagalog *sarili*, according to Mercado, can be construed in three different senses: “First, *sarili* means self. Second, by extension, *sarili* connotes freedom or independence. Third, *sarili* extends itself to property or possession. Leonardo Mercado, S.V.D., *The Filipino Mind* (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994) 32, 34. Mercado expounds, the Filipino word *sarili*, like *kaugalingun* and *met laeng*, is superficial and does not capture the essence of the Filipino ‘self’ as much as the Tagalog word *loob*, which is “characterized as (1) holistic and (2) as interior.” Mercado, “Reflections on Buut-Loob-Nakem,” 597-98. To understand the idea of *loob* as ‘cosmic self’, I refer my readers to the article on *nakem* as a ‘cosmic self’ written by Alterado. Cf. Danilo Alterado, “Nakem ken Ulimek: A Hermeneutics of Silence in the Ilocano Cosmic Self,” *Philosophia International Journal of Philosophy* 16, no. 2(2015): 127-139.
- 67 Cf. Mercado, “Reflections on Buut-Loob-Nakem,” 597-598.
- 68 Mercado, “Reflections on Buut-Loob-Nakem,” 600-601. According to Mercado, “Western man compartmentalizes himself. This way of thinking is evident in expressions like ‘not letting the emotions influence reason’ or ‘the heart having reasons which the head does not know.’ Some western philosophers have been debating on whether the intellect is superior to the will or not. Likewise western philosophy also looks at knowledge as an intellectual apprehension of reality. But the Filipino, like his Oriental neighbors, has a total way of thinking which is non-compartmentalized. The varied usages of loob attest to this fact. Thus ‘makasakit and loob’/ ‘nasakit ti nakem’ involves sorrow and pain on one’s whole being. Furthermore, this holistic view extends also to the Filipino’s nondualistic world-view. Life also is not compartmentalized.” Mercado, “Reflections on Buut-Loob-Nakem,” 598.
- 69 *Ibid.*



- 70 Albert E. Alejo explains the concept of *loób* by using the metaphor of the clay vessel in the following words: “Sa alingawngaw ng salitang loob ang larawang gumuguhit kaagad sa ating isip ay isang uri ng espasyo na may bahaging nakakulong at may bahaging nakalabas. Maaaring unang ginamit ng ating ninuno ang ganitong kategorya sa kanilang pangangalakal. – Loob ang binigkas nila upang pangalanan ang loob ng palayok na kanilang hinuhubog, habang ang hinlalaki nila ay nasa bahaging labas ng nabubuong sisidlang putik at ang ibang daliri naman ay katapat ng pumipisil mula sa loob. At dahan-dahan, nabubuo nang sabay ang loob at labas ng palayok.” (The word – loób instantaneously echoes an image of a kind of space that has a one part concealed and another exposed. Our forebears might have first used the said category in their exchanges. They uttered – loób in order to name the interior of a piece of earth that their hands were molding into a jar, while the thumb was in the exposed part and the other fingers were in front of that which was pressing from the inside. And slowly, the inside and the outside of the jar were formed at the same time.) Alejo, *Tao pó! Tulóy!*, 41. Translation was provided by Jacobo in his doctoral dissertation, “Mood of Metaphor: Tropicality,” 69.
- 71 Vicente Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University, 1988) 125.
- 72 Alejo, *Tao pó! Tulóy!*, 22. Translation is provided by Jeremiah Reyes in Reyes, Loób and Kapwa, 93.
- 73 Leonardo de Castro has previously translated *loób* as ‘will. de Castro, “Debts of Good Will,” <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Asia/AsiaDeCa.htm>. The older *Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala* also translated it as *voluntad* or will. Juan José de Noceda and Pedro de Sanlucar, *Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala* (Manila: Ramirez Y Giraudier. 1860) 193. Reyes states the following as his program for the dissertation: “I will criticize the current interpretations of loób which treat it in terms of modern “subjectivity/interiority” (section 3.1.1). As an alternative, I will use Aquinas’ metaphysical doctrine of potency and act and his psychology of “powers of the soul” to analyze loób (section 3.1.2). This will result in an interpretation that is more faithful to the normal meaning of loób as “will,” to its non-epistemological and pre-modern character and even its sense of being “inside” a person. At the same time, the use of Aquinas’ philosophy will draw out the difference between loób and Aquinas’ own concept of will (*voluntas*). Loób turns out to be a more “holistic and relational” notion of will than the *voluntas* of Aquinas (section 3.1.4).” Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa,” 72.
- 74 Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa,” 74.
- 75 *Ibid.*
- 76 Cf. Danilo Alterado, “Nakem ken Ulimek,” 132-133.
- 77 Cf. Mercado, *The Filipino Mind*, 37. Mercado expounds that this organic harmony of the ‘both/and’ is found in other indigenous Filipino words found in other languages in the Philippines, such as *buot* and *nakem*.
- 78 This has been pointed out in the article published by Reyes. Cf. Jeremiah Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction to a Filipino Virtue Ethics,” *Asian Philosophy* 25, no. 2 (2015): 148-171, doi: 10.1080/09552367.2015.1043173. Cf. also Dionisio Miranda, *Buting Pinoy: Probe Essays on Value as Filipino* (Manila: Divine Word, 1992) 68. Cf. also Prospero Covar, *Larangan: Seminal Essays on Philippine Culture*. (Manila: Sampaguita, 1998) 23.

- 79 Alejo, *Tao pô! Tulóy!*, 79.
- 80 Reyes contends that “It not only presupposes an objectively real world (based on the two traditions it can only be classified as ‘realist’), it even presupposes a world dense with spiritual entities and spiritual connections.” Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction,” 154.
- 81 Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction,” 154.
- 82 Jose De Mesa, *In Solidarity with the Culture: Studies in Theological Re-rooting* (Quezon City: Maryhill School of Theology, 1987) 46.
- 83 Miranda, *Buting Pinoy*, 84.
- 84 For a more detailed discussion on this, please see F. Landa Jocano, *Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition* (Quezon City: Punlad Research House, Inc. 1997) 9. It is true that, sometimes, when the emphasis on familial relationship is too much, the *loob* is sacrificed. It encounters a crisis that may sometimes result into an act of revolt or an outrage that mutually destroys the self and the other.
- 85 Reyes, “Loob and Kapwa,” 72, 78-84.
- 86 *Ibid.*, 80.
- 87 Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979) 11.
- 88 Miranda, *Buting Pinoy*, 127. Reyes explains this by saying that “How I treat others reveals who I am and what my *loób* is. And conversely, I know the other person most when I am on the receiving end of his own actions.” Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction,” 155. Moreover, he states that “It is part of the meaning of *loob*—of what lies within—that it must be ventilated. The *kalooban* lies inside but it must not be kept inside. In a way, it is ‘what-lies-within-that-lives-without.’ It can only be manifested and perceived externally.” Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction,” 155. Cf. also Leonardo De Castro, “Kagandahang loob: A Filipino Concept of Feminine Bioethics,” in *Globalizing Feminist Bioethics*, ed. Rosemarie Tong (Colorado: Westview, 2000) 52.
- 89 Reyes, “Loób and Kapwa: An Introduction,” 155.
- 90 Levy Lara Lanaria, “Kapwa in Pamilya Rooted in Loob of Divine Image: Thoughts from a Filipino Catholic Theologian,” *Religions: A Scholarly Journal* 6 (2014):36.
- 91 Katrin De Guia, *Kapwa: The Self in the Other, Worldviews and Lifestyle of Filipino Culture-Bearers* (Pasig City: Anvil, 2005) 28.
- 92 De Guia, *Kapwa: The Self in the Other*, 28.
- 93 Virgilio Enriquez, *From Colonial to Liberation Psychology* (Quezon City: The University of the Philippines, 1992) 52.
- 94 Enriquez, *From Colonial to Liberation*, 54.
- 95 Reyes explains this by saying “Compare my translation with the old *Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala* where *capoua* means ‘*Ambos á dos igualmente*’ [both two equally] and *capoua co tauo* means ‘*hombre como yo*’ [man like me]. de Noceda and de Sanlucar, *Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala*. See also the extensive usage of the word *kapwa* in *Urbana at Feliza*, originally published in 1864, where the word is often combined with other words, *capuoua tauo* (fellow man), *capoua bata* (fellow child), *capoua babaye* (fellow woman), *capoua escuela*(classmate), etc. Modesto de Castro, *Pag Susulatan nang Dalanang Binibini na si Urbana at ni Feliza na Nagtuturo ng Mabuting Kaugalian* (Manila: J. Martinez, 1920). I prefer this over the definitions of Enriquez and De Guia which



- mention a 'self'. They have the right idea, but their starting point is one where the self and other have already been opposed, it is the 'modern' starting point so to speak, and they wish to retrieve *kapwa* from such conditions. The English word 'self' is loaded; it has been sculpted by a long and complex history of ideas and upheavals in modern times as Charles Taylor has shown. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1989). It is closely bound to concepts such as subjectivity, autonomy and independence." Reyes, "Loob and Kapwa: An Introduction," 156.
- 96 Reyes, "Loob and Kapwa: An Introduction," 156.
- 97 Ferriols, *Pambungad sa Metapisika*, 161. Reyes translated this to English with these words: "two loob's treat each other as kapwa". Reyes, Loob and Kapwa, 99.
- 98 Reyes states that "An interesting trend in twentieth century was that philosophers tried to bring back the relational aspect to an intellectual climate which has forgotten it. This was after the complete negation of the other experienced in the Holocaust of World War II (Levinas and Buber were both Jews). However, for Levinas the Other is completely different from the Self, like the concept of infinity. [Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et Infini*. (La Haye: M. Nijhoff, 1961)]. And for Levinas, there is no hope for anything like oneness in the same sense as the Filipino *pagkakaisa*. Jaime Guevara has made a preliminary comparison between *kapwa* and the philosophy of Levinas." Reyes, "Loob and Kapwa: An Introduction," 156-57. Cf. also Jaime Guevara, "Pakikipagkapwa [Sharing/Merging oneself with Other]", in *Filipino Cultural Traits*, ed. Rolando Gripaldo (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2005) 13.
- 99 Guevara, "Pakikipagkapwa," 14.
- 100 Reyes, "Loob and Kapwa: An Introduction," 157.
- 101 Cf. Karol Wojtyla, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, trans. T. Sandok (New York: Peter Lang, 1993).
- 102 Clarke posits that "[the] perfection of being-and therefore of the person-is essentially dyadic, culminating in communion. Cf. W. Norris Clarke, "Person, Being and St. Thomas," *Communio* 19(1992):601. Cf. also W. Norris Clarke, *Person and Being* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University, 1993). See also Norris Clarke, *Explorations in Metaphysics: Being – God – Person* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1994).
- 103 W. Norris Clarke, "To be is to be Substance-in-Relation," in *Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person*, ed. W. Norris Clarke (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) 102-122.
- 104 W. Norris Clarke, *Person and being*, 218.
- 105 Karol Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, ed. Karol Wojtyla (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1993) 219–262. And Norris Clarke acknowledges his debt to Wojtyla. W. Norris Clarke, "The Integration of Personalism and Thomistic Metaphysics in Twenty-First-Century Thomism," in *The Creative Retrieval of St. Thomas Aquinas: Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old*, ed. W. Norris Clarke (New York, NY: Fordham University, 2009) 226–232.
- 106 For Reyes, this explains why Wojtyla acknowledges his indebtedness to "the phenomenology of Max Scheler and to the ethics of Immanuel Kant. But the end goal for him is still the same, that is a unity and oneness between acting persons." Reyes, "Loob and Kapwa: An Introduction," 157. Cf. Wojtyla, Karol *Wojtyla, The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979) 302.

- 107 Nicolescu, "Transdisciplinarity and Complexity."
- 108 *Ibid.*
- 109 *Ibid.*
- 110 Cf. Jaime Bulatao, S.J., *Split-level Christianity* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1966).
- 111 Certainly, I do not deny downside of this intimate relationship between the *loob* and *kapwa* because reality tells us that even in the context of *loob-kapwa* relation there are instances when respectful and loving relationship is undermined by conflicts between the *loob* (self) and *kapwa* (neighbor), which I have already explained in footnote number 89. Binswanger explains that "what we call mental disease [may] come about when the self is no longer able to distinguish between inside and outside, between existence and world...In delusions of persecution [for example] these dams have burst. Existential anxiety floods the world of fellowmen' the Dasein is threatened from everywhere, prey to all." Binswanger, *Being-in-the-World*, 311.
- 112 Dionisio Miranda, *Pagkamakabuhay: On the Side of Life: Prolegomena for Bioethics from a Filipino-Christian Perspective* (Manila: Logos, 1994) 84.
- 113 Reyes, "Loób and Kapwa," 6.
- 114 de Guia, *Kapwa: The Self in the Other*, 28.
- 115 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 116 Enriquez, *From Colonial to Liberation*, 64.
- 117 Diversity here includes conflicts and conflicting views.
- 118 Cf. Melba.P. Magay, *Filipino Religious Consciousness: Some Implications to Mission* (Quezon City: Institute for Studies in Asian Church and Culture, 2002) 5. Cf. also Florentino Hornedo, *The Favor of the Gods: Essays in Filipino Religious Thought and Behavior* (Manila: University of Santo Tomas, 2001) 81-82.
- 119 Cf. Jose de Mesa, *Why is Theology Never Far From Home* (Manila, Philippines: De La Salle University, 2003) 5-12.
- 120 According to De Mesa, "[it] is what makes the lowland Filipino what he is and who he is as a person. Not only that, it is an appropriate term to describe a person in relationship to others because it provides an insight as to what kind of person one is." Jose de Mesa, *In Solidarity with the Culture*, 45.
- 121 In view of this contribution of De Mesa to the ongoing discourse on theological contextualization or inculturation, Bevans notes two very important things: "First, this understanding of God's nature that is revealed in the context of Filipino culture is in real continuity with the ideas of the Vatican II and its understanding of revelation, but it goes beyond them as well, or at least nuances them for this particular context. This kind of "thinking through" a particular theological concept, with the recognition that "theology is never far from home" is what needs to be done in every cultural context and social location, for theology is only *theology* when it begins to make sense to particular people at particular times and in particular places... Second, however, this reflection on revelation out of Filipino culture is one that can enrich the admitted Western understanding... In fact, genuine contextual understanding of Christian faith should be able to enrich *any* understanding of revelation from *any* context." Stephen Bevans, *An Introduction Theology in Global Perspective* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2009) 25.

122 Alejo, *Tao po! Tulóy!*, 139

123 He postulates that “when God created human beings. He was first projected as a relational God-within. ‘We shall make man in our image, to our likeness’ (Genesis 1:26).” Lanaria, “Kapwa in Pamilya,” 39.

124 Lanaria, “Kapwa in Pamilya,” 39.

125 *Ibid.*, 39-40.

126 *Ibid.*